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IN· THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
s·TATE O·F UTAH 
HENRIETTA SMITH, 
Plaintiff and AppeUant, 
-vs.- Cas·e No. -~-----
GOLDE·N J. BENNE'TT, 
Defendant and Resp·ondent. 
STATEMENT OF' FACT'S 
In an action arising out of an auto p·edestrian acci-
dent which occurred on October 17, 195t, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, the District Court Judge, Honorable Joseph 
G. Jeppson, directed a verdict for the defendant upon the 
ground that the evidence showed plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence which was a p:roxirnate cause of her 
own injury as a matter of law. The question presented . 
by the ap~peal is whether the evidence presented sustains 
this finding. 
Briefly the facts are : The plaintiff, Henrietta 
Smith, at the time of the accident, on October 17, 1951 
resided between 8th and 9th West at 937 West 2nd South 
in S'alt Lake City, Utah (R. 61). ·On the same date she 
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was employed as a cashier at the Western Co-op. The 
Western Co-op is located near plaintiff's residence being 
a short distance west and on the opposite, or north side 
of the street, within the same ·block. (See Exhibit B which 
has been reproduced and included in the brief for the con-
venience of the court.) 
Second South Street in this vicinity is 60 feet wide 
including the curbs on both sides of the street and is 
divided into two lanes for traffic on the south, two lanes 
for traffic on the north, each lane being 10 feet wide, a 
cente·r strip 4 feet wide and two parking lanes, each 8 feet 
wide on either side of the street (Exhibit B). There is a 
driveway immediately adjacent to the Western Co-op, on 
the east side of the building which leads out into 2nd 
South Street. Starting where this driveway intersects 
2:nd South and extending across the street to the south 
and slightly west is a marked crosswalk. This cross,valk 
intersects the south side of 2nd S.outh at a point 267 feet 
from the center of the intersection of 2nd South and 9th 
West St.- It is 79~2 feet along 2nd South from the center 
of 9th West Street to the next street east, 8th West Street. 
(Exhibit B) 
There is a street light on the north side of 2nd South 
immediately adjacent to the driveway next to the \Vest-
ern c·o-op. There is a street light on the south side of 
2nd South in front of plaintiff's residence (Exhibit I~). 
At about 6 :05 p.m. on the evening of Oct. 17, 1951, 
plaintiff had finished her day's work at the Western Co-
op. She left the store with her ernployer, Mr. Wright, and 
another clerk, Mrs. Ostberg. S:he told \Vrig-ht goodnight 
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at the door of the store. ~irs. Ostberg accon1panied plain-
tiff to the drivevn:1Y irrunediately east of the Western 
Co-op where they parted company (R. 63). 
Aceording to her testimony, plaintiff then proceeded 
to the north curb of 2nd South. At that point she looked 
to the east 'vhere she sa"\v a car coming from 8th West, 
far enough away to allow her to cross (R. 6.5). She then 
proceeded to the center of the 2nd South Street keeping 
within the bounds of the crosswalk, (R. 65, Exhibit B). 
At this p·oint, she looked west and saw a car approaching 
between 9th and lOth West almost to lOth West (R. 65). 
She then walked east up the middle of 2nd South Street 
to a point 45 feet east of the crosswalk ( R. 66). At that 
point she stopped, looked west, saw no cars approaching 
from the west (R. 103-121-127). F·rom that point she 
started to walk to the south toward her home when she 
was struck ( R. 103-127) . 
One of the p-olice officers who investigated this 
accident, Harold A. Peterson, Jr., identified the point 
of impact from scuff marks on the pavement 69· feet east 
of the eastmost portion of the crosswalk, 14 feet from the 
south curb line of 2nd South and 13 feet south of the 
south double lines in the center of the street (R. 11). The 
defendant's automobile had brush marks on the left front 
fender and had traveled 3 feet beyond the point of im-
pact. The lights on defendant's automobile were on (R. 
16) and the brakes in working order (R. 16). The left 
~ide of the car when it came to rest was about on the 
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dividing lane between the two eastbound "lanes of traffic 
(R. 13, Exhibit B). 
Police Office·r W. 0. Cowden interrogated the de-
fendant, Golden J. Bennett, who told him that he ob-
served plaintiff in the -center portion of the street "Talking 
in a southerly direction, and that he slowed up and honked 
his horn; that he saw the pedestrian hesitate, as if she 
was going to stop, so he took his foot off the brake to 
proceed ahead; that at about that time she broke and ran. 
toward the south curb; that he immediately applied his 
brakes, but could not stop before striking plaintiff. De-
fendant stated he had been traveling about 25 miles per 
hour, realized the dangeT about 50 feet from the point of 
impact, and had slowed his speed to one mile per hour at 
the point of impact (R. 15). 
Frank W. Bonner, an independent eye witness testi-
fied that he was driving an automobile west on 2nd South 
(R. 134) at about 6:10p.m. when he first observed plain-
tiff about 75 to 80 feet in front of him (R. 137). At that 
point plaintiff was just leaving the curb (R. 13()). Rhe 
came out over the curb and proceeded on an angle (R. 
150) in a southwest direction (R .. 136) (see path traced 
on Exhibit B) toward the center of the street (R. 150). 
She appeared to be in a hurry and walked or trottPd 
(R. 137 -150). When she reached the center o.f the ~trPPt 
she appeared to hesitate then cut aeross toward her ho1ne 
on the south side of the street (R. 150, Exhibit 13). Plain-
tiff was struck at a point just ~outh of the lin<' dividin~ 
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the t\YO eastbound lanes of traffic, lanes 1 and 2, on the 
south side of 2nd South (R. 135). 
The \vitnes8 first noticed the lights of defendant's car 
coming east in the outside lane, lane number one, from a 
point do\vn 2nd South ( R. 135). He noticed the car again 
at a point just \vest of the crosswalk (R. 138). (See point 
n1arked FB on Exhibit B.) It was dusk and the street 
lights were on. Defendant's car seerned to have turned 
a little way into the inside lane, Lane 2, never completely 
leaving Lane one, and then to turn back into Lane one 
(R. 14:2). The witness placed the speed of defendant's car 
at 20-25 or 30 (R. 147) and stated defendant brought his 
car to a stop in 3 to 5 feet (R. 140). 
Anothe·r independent witness, Charles Henry Sweat, 
testified that at the time of the accident he was driving a 
car east on 2nd South in the inside lane of travel for east-
bound traffic immediately behind defendant's automobile 
which was traveling in the outside lane (R. 151-52). l-Ie 
testified that he was traveling about 25 miles per hour 
and slowed his car to 10 or 15 when he saw plaintiff (R. 
160) and that the defendant must have done the same 
as the distance between his car and defendant's ren1ained 
the same (R. 160). 
He first observed Mrs. Smith when she started across 
the road (R. 156) fro1n the north edge of the road (It 
156). She proceeded in a southeasterly direction toward 
her home (R. 157). (See path marked "HS" Exhibit B.) 
She stopped in the rniddle of the street and then "'trotted" 
into the path of defendant's vehicle (R. 157). The wit-
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ness estimated that when plaintiff started to trot acro:ss 
in front of defendant, defendant's car was no further 
than five feet fr·om her (R. 157). 
The defendant testified that he had left work at the 
Lang Company at 11th West and 2nd South (R. 20) at 
six o'clock (R. 19). From that point he traveled east on 
2nd South in Lane 1 (See Exhibit B) at a speed of :23 
miles per hour (R. 21). \Vhen he reached the point sho\rn 
as '·'Bl" on Exhibit B, 50 to 75 feet west of the cross\\·alk 
(R. 25-2.6) in front of the Western Co-op he saw· ~Irs. 
Smith approaching the yellow line in the center of the 
street at the point marked "S" of Exhibit 2. He started 
to slow the speed of his ear at a point 10 to 15 feet \V{_)St 
of the crosswalk (R. 26 marked B2 on Exhibit B). At 
that time, Mrs. Smith was at the corner of the street 
shown as s.2 on Exhibit B (R. 28). As his car crossed 
the crosswalk (B3 on Exhibit B) Mrs. S·mith hesitated 
in her c;ourse (at point 83 on Exhibit B) leading defend-
ant to believe she would yield the right of way (R. 30). 
He next observed plaintiff when his car was in the posi-
tion of "B4". Mrs. Sn1ith was still toward the center of 
the road at position S4 on E·xhibit B. When his car 
reached position "B5" on Exhibit B about 25-30 feet fron1 
plaintiff. Plaintiff started to run in front of defendant's 
ear ('R. 3'2). Defendant first applied his brakes at position 
"B:2" and slowed to 20 miles per hour ( R. 24). Assu1ni ng 
that Mrs .. S1nith was going to yield the right of way, he 
continued to point "B5" at about 20 miles per hour (I~. 
33). When plaintiff started across in front of hi~ <'ar, 
point "B5" he applied his brakes severely (It 32). 
(j 
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The defendant te8tified that at point ~•B2" on Ex-
hibit B also 1narked "BH" he honked his horn to warn 
plaintiff of the approach of his automobile (R. 35). Be-
fore darting in front of his automobile, Mrs. Smith hesi-
tated for a period of 2 or three seconds-plaintiff was 
struck by the left front fender of his vehicle (R. 39). He 
stated that at no ti1ne did he drive his car into the center 
lane, or Lane 2 (R. 42). That he had the lights turned 
on on his vehicle (R. -±7). That from the time he left 
point ''B5" he traveled about 25 to 30 feet and Mrs. 
Smith traveled 13 feet (R. 38). 
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial judge di-
rected a verdict in favor of defendant, upon the ground 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence i.n failing 
to keep a lookout for vehicles and in failing to yield the 
right of way to defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POIN·T I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
MATTER OF LAW. 
a. FAILURE TO KEEP LOOKOUT. 
b. FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY. 
POINT' II. 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF HER OWN INJURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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ARGUM.ENT 
POIN·T I. 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF HER OWN INJURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
We agree with the authorities cited in appellant's 
brief to the effect that the question of contributory negli-
gence is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that 
jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that they 
are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff was guilty ·of negligence which proximately con-
tributed to cause his own injury. Stri'c:kl·e v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., (Utah) 2:51 P (2) 867. 
However, the evidence in the record establishes that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which 
ap-proximately caused her own injury with such certainty 
that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary. 
Plain tiff was guilty of negligence in the following re-
spects: 
a. FAILURE TO KEEP LOOKOUT. 
The evidence shows that this accident happened at 
dusk, at 6 :10 p.m. in the evening and that it was not yet 
dark. The street was well lighted and the street lights 
we·re on. The street was wide open (Exhibit I & J) and 
there were no obstructions to plaintiff's vision. The de-
fendant had the lights of his car turned on. Plainti:fT \\'aR 
not in a position on the street where she n1ight have PX-
pected defendant to stop for her. The defendant's ear 
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had approached a point "\Vhere the in1pact occurred fro1n 
a point some blocks we:st. There can be no doubt that the 
car "\Yas there to be seen. It is no excuse- for plaintiff to 
say she did not see tl1e vehicle when the vehicle was there. 
'rhe length of the skid 1narks and the distance the car 
traveled after impact show that the defendant was travel-
ing at a low rate of speed. The testimony of the eye 
witnesses corroborates this. This evidence can lead us 
to only one conclusion; the plaintiff either did not look 
for the defendant's vehicle before she cross~d into the 
path of this vehicle, or if she did l·ook, plaintiff failed to 
heed what she saw. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan, Malone v. Vin-
ing, 313 Michigan 315, 21 N.E. 2d 144 aptley, defined the 
duty of a pedestrian as follows : 
"Under present day traffic conditions a pe-
destrian, before crossing a street or highway, 1nust 
(1). make proper observation as to app-roaching 
traffic, (2) observe approaching traffic and forn1 
a judgment as to its distance away and its speed, 
(3) continue his observations while crossing the 
street or highway, and ( 4) exercise that degree 
of care and caution which an ordinarily prudent 
person would exercise under like circumstances." 
The evide-nce in this case conclusively shows that the 
· · plaintiff did not exercise the degree of care required 
from a reasonably prudent p·erson. ·It logically and na-
turally follows that such heedless and inattentive con-
duct was negligence as a matter of law. Numerous courts 
including the Utah Supreme Court in similar circum-
stances have so held. 
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In Mmgus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 493, 
a directed verdict was sustained on the grounds of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence. In concluding that the 
plaintiff either did not look or did not make sufficient 
or adequate observation, this court said: 
"More convincing than the direct testiinony 
that decea;s·ed did not look, is the further evidence 
that deceased neither said nor did anything to in-
dicate that he was at all aware of the danger pre-
sented by defendant's approaching automobile. 
He seems to have heen wholly unaware of its ap-
proach~ Certainly he did nothing either to warn 
his wife, nor to rescue either himself or her from 
their position of peril. On this evidence, it n1ust 
he said as a matter of law that deceased either 
failed to look, or having looked, failed to see what 
he should have seen." 
In Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719, 
pLaintiff and his vvife were crossing the main street of 
Logan, Utah, from east to west at a point between inter-
sections. They stopped somewhere over the center of the 
highway on the west side ·of the street to allow south-
bound traffic to pass. Plaintiff was gazing in a south-
westerly direction when de.fendant's automobile, ap-
proaching from the north struck the plaintiff and injured 
him. Plaintiff's wife had seen the impending danger and. 
had stepped out of the way. Verdict w~as directed in 
favor of. defendant by the lower court and affir1ned on 
appeal, the court saying: 
"Appellant was aware of the fact that he wa~ 
taking a chance in crossing the ~trPet at a pla<'e 
contrary to law. He should also have known that 
10 
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a driYer of a vehicle \vould not ordinarily antici-
pate the presence of pedestrians on the street at 
the tiine and place of the accident. Knowing that 
his presence might not be anticipated and know-
ing that traffic on the west side of the road was 
approaehing fron1 the north and with nothing 
of importance to distract his attention, it was ap-
pellant's duty to ,y·ateh the traffic he knew was ap-
proaching his location. 
''* * ~· Having omitted to continue to watch, 
he failed to exercise the degree of care required 
of a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and 
places hi1nself in a position of peril. A greater 
degree of care is necessary upon the part of a 
pedestrian who undertakes to cross a city street 
at a prohibited place than is placed on one who 
uses a 1narked crosswalk." 
Tysinger v. Cobble Dairy Products, (N.C.) 36 S.E. 
(2d) 267: 
"Now, then, as to the alleged contributory 
negligence of plaintiff's testate, it is sufficient to 
say that in crossing the highway at ~a point other 
than a marked crosswalk at an intersection it was 
his duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles 
upon the highway. G.S:. Sec. 20-174 (a). The high-
way was visible according to all the evidence·, for 
at least 300 yards in the direction from which the 
truck of the defendant was approaching. And in 
leaving the point where he was talking to the wit-
ness Everhardt to go toward his home, he neces-
sarily faced in the direction of the oncoming truck. 
IIe must have seen the truck .and taken the chance 
of crossing or, have been inattentive to the duty 
in1posed upon hin1 by law, and started across with-
out looking f.or vehicles on the highway. In either 
event, a reading of the evidence leads to the con-
11 
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elusion as a matter of law, th-at his own conduct 
contributed to his injury and death, unfortunate 
and regrettable as it may be." 
In Horton, et al v. Stoll, (Cal.) 40 Pac. (2d) 603, 
plaintiff, ·a twenty-year old girl, was crossing between in-
tersections not in a pedestrian lane. As she came to the 
further west car track first rail, she hesitated and looked 
or glanced to the north, but failed to remember what, if 
anything, she saw. She w•as under the impression, ho\\'"-
ever, that she had plenty of time to cross the street. After 
taking a step or so, and while she was still on the car 
track, she was hit by the left front fender of defendanfs 
car coming from the north. In sustaining a non-suit, the 
court s·aid; 
"We are of the opinion that the facts of this 
case show affirmatively that plaintiff failed to 
use due care and that she failed in this respect 
was the p-roximate 0ause of the injury. 
"Had she looked she must have seen defend-
ant's car approaching a few feet away, for she 
had taken only a step or two from her position 
of safety when she was struck. 
"It was plaintiff's duty from the position 
she was in upon the highway to yield to defendant 
the right of way. 
"The only conclusion that can be reaehed 
from the evidence is that plaintiff failed to take 
the trouble to properly look for autoinobiles on 
the side of the street as she crossed, or that she 
sa'v the automobile and for so1ne unexplainPd 
reason stepped directly in its path. Under either 
theory she failed to use due care, \vhieh precludP~ 
her rights of recover.'' 
12 
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In Reid v. Ow·e~ns, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680, this 
court in holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a 1natter of la-\v said: 
._ .. A.. case verY si1nilar to the instant case is 
~-i.ndrus v. S. J. Boudreaux & Son, La. App. 158 
So. 679. There the plaintiff was foreman of about 
twelve men engaged in roadwork, about half of 
them being _on each side of the road, but not on the 
paved portion, as defendant's truck approached. 
The paYJ.naster had just pulled up· his car across 
the road from the plaintiff who p-roceeded to cross 
the road diagonally to the paymaster's car. The 
plaintiff testified he did not see defendant's truck,~ 
but the court noted a probable inference that he 
saw it fron1 the fact that he had 'walked unusually 
fast, rushed or run.' But this was in1material as 
the court found: 'The on-coming truck was in full 
open view of the road and was hound to have been 
seen by the plaintiff had he looked down the road 
at the ti1ne of starting across.' The court then 
held the plaintiff to the knowledge he would have 
had if he had looked and held: 'It was his duty 
to look for his safety before starting across. He 
must be regarded as having seen the truck whethe:r 
he looked or not'; and the court approved the 
holding of the lower court that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 'He 
should not have thus voluntarily, heedlessly, and 
thoughtlessly left a safe place and exposed him-
self to an obvious danger by trying to cross the 
road under the circumstances which attended such 
a movement.' 
"As the court said in Andrus v. S. J. B'Oudre-
aux & Son, supra, he 'vas chargeable with what 
he would have seen had he looked. He either pro-
eeeded 'vithout looking or, having seen the ap-
13 
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proaching car, he chanced crossing in face of the 
hazard. The latter would clearly, under the cir-
cumstances, have been negligence on his part. The 
approaching vehicle was at the instant of de-
ceased's entry onto the pavement so near that no 
prudent person would attempt crossing in front of 
it. The more reasonable inference is he did not 
see the car. But had he looked he would have seen 
it, and he is charged with knowledge of what he 
would have seen had he the duty to look. \V e 
think that he clearly had such duty. 
* * * 
"The presence of the barriers on the un-
traveled portion of the highway and of piles of 
dirt on -the side of the pavement, and the presence 
of workmen, would not justify deceased in assmn-
ing that the driver of a vehicle will, be.cause· of the 
presence of these elements, so drive as to avoid 
striking one who, without looking, darts out into 
the path of the vehicle. We conclude that under 
the evidence viewed most favorably to the plain-
tiffs the deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law." 
In the recent case of Cox v. Thompson (Utah) 254 P. 
(2) 1047, a wrongful death action, the evidence was that 
the deceased had started across a poorly lighted high-
way in Orem, Utah, at night and had traveled more than 
halfway across the highway, when his wife called to hin1, 
whereupon he turned and walked directly into the path of 
a southbound automohi'le. The trial court directed the 
verdict in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. This court upheld the trial eourts decision 
and said: 
14 
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··On the evidence set forth the trial court cor-
rectly found decedent contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. F'roin a fair appraisal of the evi-
dence, reasonable 1nen can draw but one inference 
and that inference points unerringly to the 
negligence of the decedent. In response from 
a call from his wife, decedent who was crossing 
east across a p·oorly lighted highway, turned and 
walked directly into the path of defendant's 
automobile. c·rossing a highway at a point where 
there was no marked crosswalk, decedent was 
duty-bound to yield the right of way to the vehicle 
upon the roadway. See 46-6-79, Utah Code -
Annotated 1953. This he failed to do. He, in 
addition apparently failed to look, or having look-
ed failed to see what he should have seen and 
paid heed to it. He said nothing and did nothing 
which indicated that he was in any way aware of 
the danger presented. Decedent was properly 
found negligent as a matter of law." 
In this case, as in the cases cited, the plaintiff either 
unaware of the app.roach of the defendant's automobile 
or heedless of her own safety, left her position of con1-
parative safety in the center of the street and walked 
directly into the path of the defendant's vehicle. Whether 
she failed to see the defendant's vehicle, as she herself 
testified, or seeing it deliberately crossed in front of the 
vehicle, in either instance, she was guilty of negligence as 
a 1natter of law. 
b. F AlLURE TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY. 
The evidence in this case discloses that the plaintiff 
may have crossed the highway where this accident oc-
curred in one of two ways. She may have started across 
the highway within the marked crosswalk and p·roceeded 
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to the center· of the highway. From that point she turned 
and walked up the center of the highway 45 feet and then 
diagonally toward the point of impact, some 69 feet east 
of the crosswalk at a point apparently between the two 
lanes of eastbound traffic. The two eye witnesses testi-
fied that the plaintiff crossed the highway more or less in 
a diagonal line from the driveway in front of the \\7 est-
ern Co-op to the point of impact. Under either version, 
plaintiff was not within the crosswalk or did not have 
a preferred position upon the highway. 
Section 46-6-79 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
"Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the 
roadway." 
It is clear that as soon as plaintiff left the center of 
the highway and proceeded directly into the path of 
eastbound traffic, she failed in her duty to yield the right 
of way as provided by law. Her failure to so yield the 
right of way was clearly negligent and it is readily seen 
that had she not continued her course, this accident would 
not have happ,ened. 
In Fearn v. City of Philad,elphia, (Pa.) 182 Atl. G:1-t, 
the court said : 
"When a pedestrian traverses a street be-
tween intersections, since he is not crossing at a 
place where he is expected to be, he must exerci:-;P 
a higher degree of care for his safety; motorist~ 
are correspondingly held to a less degree of earP.~~ 
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See also Sheldon. v. Ja1nes, (Cal.) 166 Pac. 8, where 
the court said : 
~'A greater deg~ree of care is necessary upon 
the part of the pedestrian who undertakes to cross 
a congested highway other than at the established 
crosswalk and especially so if in the act he does 
not essay a direct crossing, but pursues a long 
diagonal route. · 
"'The observation of ordinary care by such 
a pedestrian is not fully performed by merely 
looking to the left or right as he steps upon the 
street. The observance of that care is imperative 
upon him during all of the time that he is cross-
ing.~, 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The principal argument of the appellant appears 
not to be that the plaintiff was not negligent in the man-
ner in which she proceeded across 2nd S-outh Street, 
but that the trial judge should have submitted the issue 
of whether or not her negligence was a proximate cause 
of her injuries to the jury. Is the causal connection be-
tween the negligence of the plaintiff and her own injuries 
so patent as to p,reclude the submission of that issue to a 
jury~ 
In Sec. 6127 of Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automo-
bile Law and Practice, it is stated: 
"Although one may be under the duty to look 
before crossing a city street, if he is injured by an 
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automobile while crossing and would escape the 
consequences of his negligence, he must show that, 
even if he had looked, the accident would still have 
happened.'' 
If the plaintiff had seen the defendant's vehicle, 
which was plainly visible, or seeing it had yielded the 
right of way to that vehicle, the accident of which plain-
. tiff complains certainly would not have happened. 
In Burgess v. Salt Lake City railroad contpa.ny, 17 
Utah 406, 53 Pac. 1013, plaintiff in crossing Second South 
between Main and West Temple Streets looked for west-
hound street cars, but failed to look for an easbound car 
and was injured when he stepped in front of the latter. 
There was some evidence that at the place of the injury, 
there were flagstones laid flush with the paving blocks 
indicating a crossing and also evidence that pedestrians 
crossed the street at any place between Main and West 
Temple. The court reversed a judgment in favor of plain-
tiff and remanded the case for a new trial. In holding 
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law under the e.vidence, the court said, starting on page 
410 of the Utah Report: 
"On the other hand, the evidence shows that 
the plaintiff incautiously and heedlessly stepped 
upon the track, where he received the injury. In 
the hurry of the moment, he attempted to cross 
the street and track without exercising that care 
which a man of ordinary prudence ought to exer-
cise under like circumstances. Had he but used his 
senses it is clear that he could have avoided the 
accident. This it was his duty to do; and, having 
failed so to do, he cannot be heard to eomplain of 
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any InJury that resulted froin the failure which 
''Tas the proximate cause thereof. 
•'·The plaintiff, in crossing the street, was 
bound to exercise the same degree of care as that 
'vhich it was incmnbent upon the railway comp~any 
to exercise. 
~'The car has the right of way in case of meet-
ing a person or vehicles on the track, but each 
party, in order to avoid accident, is bound to exer-
cise ordinary care, and such reasonable prudence 
and precaution as the surrounding circumstances 
may require." 
In Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah 369, 
86 Pac. (2d) 37, a directed verdict in favor of defend-
ant was affirmed on the grounds that plaintiff was held 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in 
standing in a p~destrian lane, but so close to a passing 
bus that the overhang of the bus when turning struck 
her. The court on page 380 of the Utah Report quoted 
Kent v. Ogden L. & Tr. Co., 50 Utah 328, 167 Pac. 666: 
"When, as in this case, there can be no doubt 
whatever regarding the proximate cause of the 
accident, nor any doubt that it was wholly within. 
the power of the deceased at any moment before 
the coll~sion to have· averted it by merely moving a 
foot or two out of the zone of danger, this court 
cannot shirk its duty in determining the· result. 
* · * * The deceased's conduct constituted the proxi-
mate cause of the injury." 
In Trumbley v. Moore, (Neb.) 39 N. W. (2d) 613, 
plaintiff was crossing a street between intersections when 
struck by the defendant's vehicle. The evidence showed 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the wheels of the vehicle were straddling the center 
line of the road. A verdict for the plaintiff in the lo\\Ter 
court was reversed on appeal. The court said: 
"It is true that the left wheels of the Hamer 
car went over the center line, but there is nothing 
to indicate that this was the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injury. The proximate cause of the 
injury was the attempt of plaintiff to cross the 
street between intersections without looking, or if 
he did look, in not seeing that which was in plain 
sight. * * * The evidence reveals nothing 'vhich 
would excuse plaintiff's failure to see the Hamer 
car and respect the right of way that it had. .A .. 
right of way means nothing unless persons obliged 
to respect it are required to see an approaching 
favored car that is in plain sight. Plaintiff wa~ 
negligent in attempting to cross the street be-
tween intersections as he did. Negligence on the 
part of the defendant Hamer is not shown by this 
record. Under such circumstances plaintiff's own 
negligence is the proximate cause of the accident 
and there is nothing for a jury to determine. ThP 
trial court should have directed a verdict for the 
defendants." 
In Millig~ v. W ea.re, (Maine) 28 Atl. (2d) 463, 
plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained when defendant's car driven by his e1nployeP 
knocked him down as he was crossing a highway. The 
point of the three lane highway at which the aceident oc-
curred was an intersection which was 1narked with stop 
lights. Since traffic waiting for the lights was blocking 
the crosswalk, plaintiff walked between (·ars and into the 
center lane, which was reserved for left turning, and into 
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the path of defendant's rapidly approaching auto1nobile. 
The court held; 
·'By his O\Vn ad1nission the plaintiff without 
\Yarning walked through a line of cars which, until 
he en1erged, obscured his movements and stepped 
into the center lane of a main highway in front of 
a rapidly rnoving automobile which must have been 
a plain view but was not seen by him. * * * We are 
convinced that he either did not look at all to his 
left or if he did he was so inattentive that he 
failed to observe the danger which threatened 
him and take available precautions for his own 
safety. He gave the driver of the approaching 
car no time or opportunity to avoid the collision. 
It was his own negligence which was the proximate 
cause of his injuries." 
In view of the aforementioned authorities, it is plain 
that \Vhen a person attemp~ts to cross a highway and the 
evidence taken most favorably in his behalf shows that he 
heedlessly walked into the p·ath of an oncoming vehicle, 
he has failed to exercise reasonable care, and that failure 
is at least a contributing factor in his injuries. That 
principle can have no greater application than to the case 
at bar. 
While the argument is not made in plaintiff's be-
half or raised in the trial court or in her pleadings or 
otherwise, it is anticipated that the argument may be 
made or the question raised in this court as to whether 
the defendant in this case had the last clear chance to 
avoid the accident, making the question of proximate 
c·ause a jury question. 
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The doctrine of last clear chance has no application 
to a case where, as here, the defendant's negligence con-
tinued up to the event out of which the damage or injury 
arises. We quote the example given by Justice Wolfe 
in Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346 166 P (2) 230, on 
page 359 of the Utah Report: 
"A defendant is exceeding the lawful re-
stricted speed limit; another driver, the plain tift 
fails to keep a proper lookout and crosses the 
path of the oncoming car and gets stalled on it~ 
path. Both up to that point might be guilty of 
negligence and neither be able to recover against 
the other. But if the oncoming driver, realizing 
the situation of the plaintiff, had a clear oppor-
tlinity to avoid the accident and failed to utilize 
it, that counts just as if the plaintiff had not 
been negligent and the defendant had been." 
In the Mingus vs. Olsen case, supra, where the evi-
dence would sustain a finding that the deceased had 
proceeded 19 feet from the curb of a street into the 
street at a speed less than three. miles per hour, and the 
defendant approached the point of impact at a speed of 
twenty miles per hour, and the defendant could havP 
stopped his car had he seen deceased crossing, Justice 
Wade in a concurring opinion on page 516 of the lJtah 
Report said; 
"In the present case, both defendant and 
decedent were guilty of the san1e kind of negli-
gence. Each negligently failed to observe the 
approach of the other. The negligenee of Paeh 
continued to the ti1ne of the accident and either 
of the1n could have avoicled the aeeident \vithin 
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a Yery 8hort tilne prior to the impact had he 
observed the approach of the other. There does 
not appear to be any good reason why the last 
clear chanee doctrine should allow a recovery 
under these circumstances." 
In the case of Cox vs. Thompson, supra, this court 
said: 
·~The actors negligent conduct is a legal cause 
of harn1 to another (himself) if, 
(a) His conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm. 
(b) There is no rule of law relieving the 
actor from liability because of the manner in 
\vhich his negligence resulted in the harm." 
If decedent had ·yielded the right of way to defend-
ant's automobile or if he had looked up the road and 
had seen the ap-proaching car and paid he·ed to the 
danger which it presented, the accident would not have 
happened. It is patent that the negligence of the dece-
dent was a substantial factor in bringing about his 
death, 
In this case the plaintiff could have avoided the 
accident up to the very instant of the impact had she 
been observing the proper care for her own safety by 
simply remaining in the center of the street a moment 
or two longer and allowing the defendant's vehicle to 
pass. 
Moreover the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance could 
have no application to the evidence of this case s1nce 
it does not appear that the defendant had a clear 
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opportunity to avoid the accident after he becarne aware 
of the plaintiff's position of peril. In the case of Cox 
vs. Thompson, supra, the court said: 
"The last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable 
in the present instance. In order for the question 
of last clear chance to he properly submitted to 
a jury the evidence must be such as would in all 
probability reasonably support a finding that 
there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the injury. 
It would not be sufficient that it appear frorn 
hindsight that by some possible measure the 
defendant by the "skin of his teeth" could have 
avoided the injury. See Morby vs. Rogers, 
(Utah) 25'2 P 2d 231." 
"This court has adopted as the rule in this state the 
last clear chance doctrine· of Sections 4 79 and 480 of the 
Restatement of Torts. See Compton et al_ vs. Ogden 
Union Ry. (Jfnd Depot Co., supra. Section 480 reads: 
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reason-
able vigilance could have o!bserved the danger 
created hy the defendant's negligence in tin1e to 
have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, 
but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plain-
tiff's situation, and (b) realized or had reason to 
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and 
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time 
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negli-
gent in failing to utilize with reasonable care 
and competence his then existing ability to avoid 
harming the plain tiff.'' 
"(See concurring opinion in Morby vs. Rogers, supra, 
wherein Section 480 of thP RPstateinent of Torts i~ 
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di~eussed concerning the apparent need for defendant 
to be antecedently negligent and the suggestion therein 
made that it is necessary to fran~e a rule in the light 
of defendant'~ antecedent negligence.) 
HThus the matter was properly withheld from 
the jury if the evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably 
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant 
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b) 
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff was 
inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in 
time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant was 
. thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with rea-
sonable care and competence his then existing 
ability to avoid harming decedent." 
As was said in Compton vs. Ogden Union Ra.ilway 
& Depot Co., Utah 235 P 2d 515: 
"The rule approved by this court where plain-
tiff is negligently inattentive and has subjected 
himself to risk of harm as provided in Section 480 
is that he can recover from a defendant who knew 
of his situation and realized or had reason to 
realize that plaintiff is inattentive, and unlikely 
to discover his peril in time to avoid harm, and 
thereafter is negligent in failing to use ordinary 
care with the means at his disposal to avoid 
harming him. F'or the rule to be otherwise, we 
would again only have the negligence of the plain-
tiff and defendant concurring together to proxi-
mately cause the injury. * * * 
"In the principal case in order for plaintiffs 
to 1nake out a case of last clear chance, it would 
have been necessary that the defendant know that 
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decedent was in a position of peril, and in addi-
tion have realized or had reason to realize that 
decedent was inattentive and unlikely to discover 
her peril in time to avoid the threatened har1n, 
and defendant must thereafter have failed to 
exercise reasowable care iln co111nection with its 
then existing ability to avoid harming decedent." 
(Italics ours.) 
Not only must the evidence show that the defendant 
had an opportunity to avoid the accident after he 
becomes or has reason to be aware of plaintiff's negli-
gence, but the opportunity must he shown by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Th~ case of Graha.m v-s. Johnson, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, 
109 Utah 346, involved the opportunity of a defendant 
to avoid injury to a_ thirteen year old hoy playing ball 
in the street. The court said: 
" * * * But in the last clear chance doctrine 
the word 'clear' has significance. In a case ·such as 
this when both parties are more or less rapidly 
changing their positions the evidence must be 
clear and convincing that the party whom it is 
claimed could have avoided the accident had a 
'clear' chance to do so. 
"Construing any reasonable combination of 
facts on this theory of the case most favorable 
to Gary, if Darlene was coining at 10 1niles an 
hour down the extreme west side of the street 
and Donald shout~d at Gary setting hin1 off 
tovvard the ear when he, as 1nust in such case btl 
inferred, was not then in danger, the jury 1nust 
be instructed that it should be clea rlv convinced 
in such casP that she was far enough north of 
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hin1 a~ to giYe her a rlPar chance to avoid the 
accident. '}_"'hat is to say, she must have had a 
clear and a1nple opportunity to sense the danger 
into "'"hich he '\Vas coming and clearly have had 
tiine after that to apply her brakes and stop the 
car after she sensed or should reasonably have 
sensed that he \vas putting himself into danger. 
Other"~ise there is no room for the application of 
the last clear chance doctrine. One should not be 
held liable for failing to avoid the effect of the 
other's negligence in a situation where it is specu-
latiYe as to ,\~hether he was afforded a clear 
opportunity to avoid it. In a situation where Q9th 
parties are on the move the significance of the 
word 'clear' is most important. Otherwise we 
may· put the onus of avoiding the effect of one's 
negligence on a party not negligent. That party's 
negligence only arises when it is definitely estab-
lished that there was ample time and opportunity 
to avoid the accident which was not taken advan-
tage of." 
In analyzing whether or not the defendant had a 
clear chance to avoid injury to the plaintiff, after the 
plain tiff had placed herself in a perilous position and 
defendant had become aware of her situation and what 
the defendant did to avoid the accident thereafter, we 
must analyze the testimony of ~he defendant himself. 
The evidence is that when the defendant reached 
the point "Bl" some 50-75 ft. west of the crosswalk 
which is still 69 feet west of the point of impact, he 
first noted the plaintiff in the center of the highway a.t 
point "Sl." When he was at point "B2", still some 15 
fPet west of the crosswalk, he honked his horn and 
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reduced his speed of his automobile from 25 to 20 1niles 
per hour. At that point the plaintiff was still in the 
center of the highway. Not until the defendant's vehicle 
had reached a point 25-30 feet from the point of impact 
did the plaintiff leave the center of the street and start 
ac~oss in front of his vehicle. Up to that point, the 
defendant had been led to assume by the fact that plain-
tiff had remained in the center of the street that she 
would yield the right of way to his automobile. ''Then 
it became apparent that she was not going to yield the 
right of way, the defendant immediately applied his 
brakes and reduced his speed to one n1ile per hour, con-
tinuing on only 3 feet beyond the point of hnpact. 
Moreover, we need not rely on the defendanfs version 
entirely since it is cooberated by the testimony of the 
indep·endent witnesses. Both Frank Bonner and Charles 
Sweet testified that the plaintiff hesitated in the center 
of the highway. Charles s,veat testiifed that the defend-
ant's vehicle was only five feet from the plaintiff at 
the tin1e she crossed in front of the defendant's vehicle. 
It is apparent from the fact that the defendant had 
almost entirely stopped his vehicle at the point of i1npact 
that he did all that might he reasonable and expected 
of him to avoid injury .to the plaintiff after he becan1e 
aware of her situation. In fact, analyzing the defendant'~ 
testimony it is apparent that not only was he not nPgli-
gent after he became aware of plaintiff's position of 
peril, but that he was not negligent in any respect at 
any time. There is no evidence that he was travelin!~ 
at a high or unreasonable rate of speed. ~'here i~ no 
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evidence tlutt he failed to see the plaintiff on the high-
'v-ay. He undertook to warn the plaintiff of the a.p·p·roa.ch 
of his auton1obile by honking his horn. He continually 
\\Tatched the plaintiff on the highway. He was led by 
her actions to believe that she was not going to yield 
the right of 'Yay. He did everything that might be 
reasonably expected to avoid hitting her. It is submitted 
therefore that not only does the evidence fail to show 
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care 
after he disco\yered the plaintiff in a position of peril 
by reason of her O\Vn negligence, but that there is no 
evidence that he at any tin1e was guilty of negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge in an action brought to recover 
damages by reason of the negligence of another should 
not take the issue of contributory negligence from the 
jury if there is a reasonable basis upon which reasonable 
n1inds might conclude that they are not convinced by 
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence or that such negligence proxi-
mately caused the injury for which the plaintiff is seek-
ing to recover. The evidence in this case, taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, leaves no reasonable 
doubt that the plaintiff was· guilty of contributory negli-
gence and that such negligence proximately contributed 
to her own injury. 
The evidence shows that, even though the plaintiff 
with very little inconvenience to herself could not have 
proceeded directly across the street within the confines 
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of a marked crosswalk, in which event she \vould have 
preference over vehicles using said highway. Plaintiff 
chose to leave the comparative safety of the cross"Talk 
and to cross the highway at a point where vehicles had 
the preferred status and she was required to yield the 
right of way under section 41-6-79, Utah Code Annotated 
19'53. 
The evidence further shows that the plaintiff had 
every opportunity to observe the approach of the defend-
ant's automobile and that she either failed to observe 
the automobile or, o:bserving it, was heedless of the 
danger involved and crossed directly in front of the 
automobile. Except for her failure to observe and yield 
the right of way to the defendant's automobile, thi~ 
accident would not have happened. Her conduct was an 
integral part of the casual factors giving rise to her 
own injuries which were a proximate and natural result 
of such conduct. 
The defendant had no reason to believe that the 
plaintiff would cross in front of his vehicle, but on the 
contrary, had a right to assume and indeed was led to 
believe by the plaintiff's own conduct, in hesitating in 
the center of the highway, that the plaintiff would yield 
the right of way to his vehicle. When it became apparent 
to him that the plaintiff did not intend to so yiPld thr 
right of way, he applied his brakes and took all reason-
able precaution to avoid the accident so suece~~fully 
that had the plaintiff been three feet further Pa~t on 
the highway, his efforts would have been succe~~f~l. 
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that the court 
did not err in directing a verdict against the plaintiff, 
but that the status of the evidence directed that he do so. 
Respectfully submit~ed, 
STEW ART, CANNO·N & HANSON 
. By EDWIN B. CANNON 
REx J. HANSON 
DoN J. HANSON 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN' JR. 
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